Affiliation Service
Introduction
      
      The   Affiliation Service provides input to reputation assessment mechanisms,   whereby a validated domain is compared to a list of domain names whose   owners are known to be members of a particular group. This information   can be used for giving special treatment to messages known to be from   that domain.
      
      Its   initial proposed use is to provide positive identification of a domain   as belonging to a bona fide member of a particular group of high-value   domain names that are often the subjects of “phishing” attacks, or   confidence schemes, through email.  Major examples are names belonging   to financial institutions and better-known non-profit organizations. The   intent is to “certify” that such domains are affiliated with legitimate   members of those groups, allowing end users to be confident that the   message is likely not fraudulent.  Note that this does not produce an   opinion about the desirability of the message, but only of its   legitimacy.
      
      Technical Details
      
      This   service is predicated on the use of two open Internet standards, namely   DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) and Vouch By Reference (VBR).  DKIM   provides a mechanism enabling a domain name owner to take responsibility   for its handling of a message by attaching its domain name to the   message using a cryptographic signature.  VBR allows an agent to publish   a list of domain names known to be in a specific trustworthy group.    The specifications are IETF documents:
    
      The   Trusted Domain Project oversees the development and maintenance of open   source implementations of both of these specifications.
      
      Given   the inherently insecure nature of electronic mail on the Internet, DKIM   presents a novel concept in that it attaches a domain name to a message   in a way that cannot be done other than by the owner of that domain   name.  Thus, any other party cannot attach that domain name to a message   in the same way, and a validated DKIM signature guarantees that the   owner of that domain name was involved in the handling of that message.    However, the inverse is not true; a signature that does not validate is   not an automatic indication of fraud.  Furthermore, the absence of a   valid signature tells us nothing.  It can only be used for positive   identification.
      
      Vouch   By Reference is designed to allow an agent to list multiple names in a   way that can be queried.  Its design focuses on listing trusted email   sending parties such as list operators or domains that send valid   transactional email.  Thus, one queries a VBR list to see if a domain   name is known to be in a trusted set.  Rather than having any given   receiving site on the Internet maintain a list of domains it trusts, it   instead trusts a “voucher” to maintain such a list.  As with DKIM, only   positive claims can be made with VBR; the absence of a name on such a   list is not an indication of a problem with the owner of that name.  It   is important to note that VBR does not provide any statement about the   domain name or its owner other than that name being present in the list.    It is not itself a reputation service.
      
      The   two combined present a powerful mechanism.  If common fraud targets,   such as banks or non-profit organizations, all applied DKIM signatures   in order to “stamp” their mail with their own domain names, then   receivers could extract those names from valid signatures.  Then, if   lists of domain names known to belong to bona fide members of those   classes could be queried, then it would be possible to identify mail   that came from real banks or real non-profits.  Finally, where those two   tests both succeed, the end user could be shown some kind of annotation   or tag on the message that indicates its apparent validity as coming   from (or being handled by) a known member of that set of domains.
      
      Thus,   by deploying these open standards technologies, for which free and open   implementations already exist, it is possible to allow end users to   identify valid messages coming from common fraud targets, and proceed   with skepticism when reading messages that do not bear the markings of a   valid source.
      
      Prototype
      
      Our   proposal involves creating a prototype deployment focusing on either   banks or major non-profits in the United States.  We plan to find an   appropriate organization to create a prototype registry containing the   domain names in active use by a few of these organizations that are   willing to try it, and have them begin to deploy the sender-side   components of DKIM and VBR.
 We have already discussed this work with   Google Mail (Gmail) and they are willing to experiment with the   receiver-side portions of DKIM and VBR, and to annotate messages passing   these tests with a “gold seal” (or similar) that is presented to end   users.
      
      After   this proof-of-concept phase is completed, we will seek to scale this up   to cover all banks, or all non-profits, or any other classification of   domain names where the benefits would be valuable, by engaging   facilitators in government and/or trade organizations, including finding   a place to host the VBR lists with redundancy and creating a mechanism   to add/remove vetted names.  At this point we would also seek   endorsement and/or support from government and industry to bolster both   legal and technical infrastructure.
      
      Acknowledgments
      
      This service was inspired by work done by Dave Crocker and Jeff MacDonald as a project under mipassoc.org.